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Introduction 
This paper addresses a prevailing assumption 
in single-agent heuristic search theory - that 
problem-solving algorithms should guarantee 
shortest-path solutions, which are ty pically 
called optimal. Optimality implies a metric for 
judging solution quality, where the optimal so­
lution is the solution with the highest quality. 
W hen path-length is the metric, we will distin­
guish such solutions as p-optimal. 
However, for most applications, finding p­
optimal solutions requires exponential com­
putation time. Shortest-path algorithms are 
then unacceptable to real-world users, who pre­
fer satisficing solutions which can be achieved 
quickly. 
Why are our problem-solving algorithms in­
compatible with the desires of real-world users? 
We contend that this is because the current ap­
proach to single-agent heuristic search has over­
looked two important facts about real-world 
problem-solvers: 
1. They use a variety of attributes to measure 
the quality of solutions, not simply path­
length. 
2. They are resource-bounded, and cannot 
perform the exponential computation re­
quired by shortest-path algoritms. 
•supported by a. grant from Heuristicra.ts. 
To address the first issue, we describe the ap­
plication of multiattribute utility theory, a for· 
mal method for capturing the subjective pref­
erences of a problem-solver, in the context of 
heuristic search. In doing so, we generalize the 
notion of solution quality, and therefore opti­
mality, to incorporate user-defined attributes, 
both of solution-paths and the search algo· 
rithms which find them. We will refer to this as 
s-optimality (optimality over arbitrary, subjec­
tively determined criteria). In such a frame­
work, optimal solutions are those which are 
most preferred by, or most satisfy the user. ?­
optimality is then simply the special case in 
which the problem-solver's only concern is the 
length of the solution-path. 
The second issue is the infeasibility of expo­
nential computation. Such computation is only 
required to satisfy the guarantee of p-optimality. 
We offer theoretical and practical arguments 
against algorithms which make such guaran­
tees, and in favor of probabilistic algorithms, 
which attempt to find solutions that maximize 
expected utility. We describe first results of re­
search on this class of algorithms. 
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Outline of the Paper. 
The first section presents background infor-
. mation on current approaches to heuristic 
search in single-agent problems. Section 2 re­
assesses existing algorithms' guarantee of p­
optimality, and shows that guaranteeing ei­
ther p-optimality or s-optimality is impossible 
for real-world problem-solvers. Because agents 
must therefore act without guarantees of op­
timality, Section 3 reviews decision-theoretic 
methods for rational decision-maki_ng under un­
certainty. In Section 4, we discuss probabilistic 
algorithms which attempt to maximize solution 
quality while operating under uncertainty. Fi­
nally, Section 5 presents preliminary results and 
future directions of this research. 
1 Background 
1.1 Problem-Solving Search 
The state-space approach to problem-solving 
considers a problem as a quadruple, (S, 0 C 
S x S, I E S, G C S). S is the set of possible 
states of the problem. 0 is the set of opera­
tors, or transitions from state to state. I is the 
one initial state of a problem instance, and G 
is the set of -goal states. Any problem can be 
represented as a state-space graph, where the 
states are nodes, and the operators are directed, 
weighted arcs between nodes (the weight asso­
ciated with each operator, Oi, is its cost C( Oi)). 
Solving a single-agent problem consists of deter­
mining a sequence of operators, Ot. 02, . . . On 
which, when applied to I, yields a state in: G. 
Such a sequence is called a solution-path, with 
cost 2:?=1 C(Oi)· Without loss of generality, 
we equate cost with distance and will refer to a 
minimal cost solution-path as a shortest-path. 
1.2 Traditional Algorithms 
Many common algorithms (e.g. A*) guarantee 
p-optimality. To do so, they must both find 
a solution-path and verify that no shorter one 
exists. 
In theory, p-optimal solutions may be found 
by brute-force search over the state-space. 
However, as most problems' state-spaces are 
prohibitively large, current algorithms use heur­
istic methods to focus a search. To do so, such 
algorithms demand admissible heuristics, those 
which do not overestimate path-length. Despite 
improved performance over brute-force meth­
ods, these algorithms still require exponential 
computational time [6]. 
1.3 Non-Traditional Algorithms 
Early researchers recognized that p-optimal so­
lutions are seldom preferred to solutions which 
provide slightly longer paths but require less 
computational effort - these were known as 
satisficing solutions. This prosaic recognition, 
however, has led to few concrete results. 
One research direction was to study the ef­
fects of using inadmissible heuristics within ex­
isting shortest-path algorithms. Though p­
optimality could not be guaranteed, solution­
paths of acceptable length could often be found 
quickly [6,7]. Unfortunately, there were few pre­
cise guarantees regarding the length of solution­
paths which one could expect to find, or the 
computational effort required to do so. 
Another approach considered real-world do­
mains which require satisficing search [9]. Satis­
ficing search is applied to problems where many 
solution-paths are deemed "good enough", and 
one seeks any such path while attempting 
to minimize computation time. In theorem­
proving, for example, any proof is satisficing, 
and one wishes only to determine whether a 
proof exists. 
Despite these efforts, most current research 
still centers on the development of techniques 
which guarantee p-optimal solutions - we will 
refer to this as the guaranteed optimality re­
quirement on algorithms. 
2 Generalized Optimality 
Consider, however, a general evaluating a bat­
tle plan. W hile his overall objective is to win 
the battle, he will prefer some plans to others 
based on attributes such as danger to equip­
ment, danger to civilians, proximity of journal­
ists, etc. Another general might choose differ­
ent attributes by which to measure the qual-
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ity of possible plans. Even if the two use the 
same attributes, they may weight their impor­
tance differently. Thus, an optimal solution to 
this problem may be different for each of these 
problem-solvers, as assessing the quality of so­
.lutions involves subjectivity. 
Striving for p-optimality oversimplifies real­
world problem-solving, because it optimizes 
only path-length. To determine the quality of 
a solution in the general case, we must consider 
the tradeoffs among all attributes the problem­
solver deems relevant. We will refer to this ex­
tended view of optimality as a-optimality ( opti­
mality over arbitrary, subjectively determined 
criteria). 
Continuing the example, assume that the 
general does not yet have a plan to evaluate. 
His problem is to choose, from among his staff 
of colonels, one who will construct a plan. One 
young colonel is extremely imaginative, and as­
sures the general that he can produce a bril­
liant and saie strategy, but will require 3 days 
to prepare it. Another, a quick thinker, can 
formulate a plan in less than 3 hours, but ad­
mits that it will be somewhat risky. Had these 
plans been drawn up a priori, the general woUld 
almost certainly choose the former. Unfortu­
nately, simply choosing between the plans is not 
the problem the general must solve. His task is 
to choose between the planners, the colonels. 
In situations where time is important enough 
to the general, he would be "forced" to opt for 
the second colonel and his quick and dirty plan. 
In this example, the complexity of developing a 
plan (computation time) is a crucial attribute to 
consider in assessing the plan's overall quality. 
Thus solution quality is m�asured by user­
defined attributes, which can describe both the 
ultimate solution-path and costs incurred by 
the algorithm which generated it. The algo­
rithm (colonel), together with the solution-path 
(battle-plan) it generates, form a solution for 
the problem-solver (general). H in searching for 
a solution-path an algorithm drains resources 
which the problem-solver values, such as time 
or space, then the execution of the algorithm 
degrades the quality of the solutions it will pro­
vide. This will be shown to drastically alter our 
views about problem-solving algorithms. 
2.1 Guarantees 
Returning brie:fiy to p-optill}.ality, if an algo­
rithm guarantees a p-optimal solution, it must 
both find it, and verify that no shorter solution 
exists. 
Clearly, for brute-force algorithms this re­
quires exponential time, to explore the tree of 
possible solution-paths. Heuristic methods are 
more efficient because they prune entire sub­
trees (i.e. many paths) at once. Ty pically, how­
ever, pruning techniques are unable to reduce 
the exponential complexity of the verification 
process. 
Having seen that guaranteeing p-optimality 
requires exponential time, we now consider the 
complexity of guaranteeing s-optimality. 
2.2 An Impossibility and a Paradox 
Consider three types of agents who may en­
gage in problem-solving. The first is a typi­
cal real-world problem-solver who must operate 
with bounded resources. The second is an ide­
alized problem-solver whose resources are un­
bounded. Constraints of the real-world do not 
restrict him, but, other things being equal, he 
·prefers solutions which require fewer of his re­
sources. The third agent is also idealized, and 
differs from the second only in that, other things 
being equal, he is indifferent to the quantity of 
resourses he must allocate to solve a problem. 
The third agent is of little interest to us. Be­
cause he is indifferent to computation time, for 
example, we may conclude that he is indifferent 
to ever finding a solution to his problem - an 
algorithm which never terminates would satisfy 
him! We do not consider this behavior goal­
oriented, nor this agent a problem-solver. 
Resource-Bounded Agents We now show 
that for the resource-bounded agent, achieving 
s-optimality is impossible. 
Consider the example of a robot mailman, 
who must deliver packages in its office build­
ing during an 8 hour workday. H the building 
and number of packages are sufficiently large, 
then any strategy which involves a precomputed 
plan (to visit each office, each day) will fail, be­
cause the plan will require more than 8 hours 
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to execute. Similarly unacceptable is any al­
gorithm which requires more than 8 hours to 
compute a delivery route. This problem-solver 
is constrained by the upper limit of 8 hours on · 
computation and execution time. 
Unfortunately, as problem size increases, the 
exponential complexity of verifying the optimal­
ity of a solution will exceed the robot's allot­
ted time. Thus we conclude that for sufficiently 
large problems, a resource-bounded agent can­
not guarantee s-optimality. 
Ideal Agents For the ideal agent, who seeks 
to conserve his resources, achieving s-optimality 
yields a paradox. 
Consider an algorithm A which claims to 
guarantee s-optimality for any problem in­
stance. Assume that the s-optimal solution 
to this problem is X, with solution-path Xp. 
One of the attributes of X is the time Xtc re­
quired to compute it. Computation time will 
be measured in terms of the critical operation 
of A - node generation (generating a neighbor­
ing state, given a state and an operator). We 
assume that the algorithm can only know the ef­
fects of an operator by applying it - any other 
consideration of the effects of an operator con­
stitutes node generation as well. 
In order to find X, algorithm A must generate 
at least the nodes in Xp. Otherwise, A could not 
produce the complete path Xp, and would not 
be s-optimal. 
On the other hand, A may generate at most 
those nodes in Xp. If not, another solution, 
X', which generates only those nodes in Xp, 
would be preferred, and thus X could not be 
s-optimal. 
Therefore, to achieve s-optimality, A must ex­
pand exactly those nodes in Xp. However, if so, 
A would have insufficient information to verify 
that X was s-optii?-al: in particular, it could 
have missed a shorter path Xp'· 
Consider that at any point in the search, A 
is forced to choose a move based on the exam­
ination of only one operator - the correct one. 
If A did not know the solution-path a priori, it 
could not guarantee that alternate moves might 
not have led to a shorter solution-path. 
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Paradoxically, if one attempts to verify that 
a solution is s-optimal, he degrades its quality, 
guaranteeing that it will not be s-optimal. Only 
by prior knowledge of the s-optimality of a solu­
tion could the agent have made such a guaran­
tee. We conclude that even ideal agents cannot 
guarantee s-optimality. 
An analogy can be made to Heisenberg's U n­
certainty Principle, which states that an ob­
server is not independent of the observations he 
makes, and that the act of observation disturbs 
the environment. Similarly, solution-paths do 
not exist independent of the algorithms which 
find them- the price of executing search algo­
rithms is exacted from the solutions they yield. 
The paradox suggests that current approaches 
to heuristic search may be misguided. 
2.3 Relaxing Guaranteed Optimality 
In addition to theoretical paradoxes, there are 
many practical illustrations of the problems "in­
curred when attempting to guarantee optimal­
ity: 
efficiency: Algorithms which guarantee p­
optimality are prohibitively expensive, and 
are therefore rarely used in the real-world. 
The best-known shortest-path algorithms 
require hours of processing to solve even a 
child's Fifteen Puzzle. 
applicability: Many real-world problems im­
pose constraints on the time an agent may 
hesitate between moves. Researchers who 
have studied two-player games have devel­
oped algorithms (e.g. Iterative Deepening) 
to cope with these constraints. In single­
agent domains, researchers have failed, un­
til recently [4], to do so. 
visibility: Observing the consequences of 
intermediate actions is likely to increase 
an agent's understanding of its environ­
ment. This is the motivation apparent in 
many human activities, such as exploratory 
surgery. 
adaptability: Unanticipated changes in 
an agent's environment may render pre­
computed solutions useless. This could be 
due to natural causes, or to adversaries, 
who deliberately attempt to thwart the 
agent's plans. 
The guaranteed optimality requirement has 
caused problems in practice as well as in theory, 
limiting the applicability of single-agent search 
methods to an extremely small set of problems. 
Thus, a problem-solver, theoretically inca­
pable of guaranteeing s-optimality, cannot be 
certain, before he takes an action, that it will 
lead to the s-optimal solution. Operating un­
der uncertainty, an agent can only estimate the 
eventual consequences, or outcomes, which will 
result from his immediate actions, and make de­
cisions based on his subjective assignment of so­
lution quality to these outcomes. 
Researchers studying single-agent problems 
have traditionally avoided this issue of decision­
making under uncertainty for two reasons: they 
fail to look beyond p-optimality in measuring 
solution quality, and their algorithms are un­
able to commit to actions without having ver­
ified p-optimality. However, a formal method 
for decision-making under uncertainty can be 
found in the field of Decision Theory, the ele­
ments of which we now summarize in the con­
text of heuristic search. 
3 Decisions under Uncertainty 
3.1 Expected Value 
Returning to p-optimality, for simplicity, the 
first approach in the context of search would 
likely be to relinquish the guarantee of p­
optimality, but strive to minimize expected 
. path-length whenever possible. This is equiv­
alent to stating that the proper objective of a 
rational agent is to maximize the expected value 
of the outcome (his expected return). 
The following problem is a simple example 
of the decisions which rational agents are likely 
to face. Consider a choice among possible out­
comes, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
Outcome (1) promises a 55-move solution to 
our problem - although that may be longer 
than we would like, we would receive it with 
absolute certainty. Outcome (2), however, is 
55 moves 
10 moves 
Agent 
90 moves 
45 moves 
Figure 1: Agent to move 
probabilistic. Depending on the outcome of a 
coin :flip we will receive either a 10-move solu­
tion (heads) or a 90-move solution (tails). Us­
ing the expected value decision rule, we would 
analyze this situation as follows: Outcome (1) 
yields a 55-move solution all the time, so its ex­
pected value is simply 55-moves. Outcome (2) 
would y ield a 10-move solution with proba­
bility t and a 90-move solution with proba­
bility 2, and thus would have expected value 
(10 moves· �)+ (90 moves· �)= 50 moves. As­
suming we wish to minimize solution-length, we 
should gamble and choose outcome (2). Shni­
larly, if another outcome, (3), had offered a solu­
tion of 45-moves, we would have chosen it rather 
than the gamble. 
This decision rule, however, ignores the exis­
tence of overriding preferences which individ­
ual decision-makers may have. For example, 
faced with the choices outlined above, a cau­
tious decision-maker might avoid the gamble in 
both situations. 
3.2 Expected Utility 
The theory of expected utility [10) was proposed 
as an improvement to the expected value rule, 
and has come to be the central tool in modern 
decision analysis. Utility is the subjective as­
signment of value to potential outcomes, when 
the exact outcome is uncertain. The theory 
claims that rational agents will attach utilities 
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to all possible outcomes, and when faced with a 
decision under uncertainty, select that outcome 
with maximum expected utility. · Maximizing 
expected utility thus subsumes the special case 
of maximizing expected value. 
Note that the rational agent may be unable 
to produce such utility assignments on demand. 
But, if we subscribe to this theory, we can ob­
serve his decision-making, determine the util­
ities that he assigns to sample outcomes, and 
interpolate to produce his overall utility func­
tion [5]. 
It is important to note the inherent subjec­
tivity of the utility assignments. For example, 
different decision-makers may have different at­
titudes towards the risk of uncertain outcomes. 
Recalling our earlier example (Figure 1), we are 
faced with a choice between two possible out­
comes (1) & (2). Using the expected utility de­
cision rule, our analysis changes. The expected 
utilities are as follows: 
(1) u(55 moves) 
(2) (u(10 moves)· t) + (u(90 moves)· t) 
. Ultimately, the choice will be based on the 
decision-maker's utility function u(). 
For example, one might assign these utilities: 
u(10 moves) 
u(55 moves) 
u(90 moves) 
= 
= 
= 
1.0 
0.6 
0.0 
Here, the decision-maker desires the 10-move 
solution, but would prefer to avoid the possi­
bility of receiving the 90-move solution. The 
55-move solution is good enough. Based on his 
expected utility, he chooses outcome (1), avoid­
ing disaster. His behavior is termed risk averse. 
A risk prone decision-maker may be desper­
ately trying to obtain a short solution. He 
agrees that a 10-move so�ution is superior, but 
sees little difference between the 55- and 90-
move solutions, and assigns u(55 moves)= 0.1. 
Based on his expected utility, he chooses the 
gamble, outcome (2). 
3.3 Multiattribute Utility 
Of course, real-world decision-makers are not 
faced with such simple choices, but typically 
consider utilities of many attributes, such as 
solution length, computation time, monetary 
cost, and memory usage. Required is a tech­
nique of assessing the tradeoffs among the many 
possible attributes of solutions. 
The extension of utility theory which de­
scribes the behavior of a decison-maker faced 
with multiple, and possibly conflicting objec­
tives is multiattribute utility theory. This the­
ory allows one to combine utility functions of 
individual attributes into a joint utility func­
tion. A formal, rigorous presentation is offered 
in [5]. 
Oversimplifying, the techniques involve as­
sessing the decision-maker's marginal utility of 
improving each of the attributes. In addi­
tion, the utility independence relations of the 
attributes must be determined by assessing 
whether the utility function for each attribute 
is independent of the values of the others. 
Given this information, which can be elicited 
systematically from the decision-maker, one can 
determine what form the multiattribute func­
tion should take. If all the attributes are mu­
tually utility independent, an additive function 
is used, as the decision-maker seeks simply to 
maximize the sum of the utilities. If not, a 
multiplicative or multilinear combination of the 
individual utility functions may be required. 
In the worst case of total interdependence one 
can only determine the decision-maker's utility 
function by observing his decisions and plotting 
points in n-dimensional attribute-space. 
Once constructed, the multiattribute utility 
function can be evaluated for all potential out­
comes, which are specified as an n-tuple of in­
dividual attribute values. 
In summary, multiattribute utility theory of­
fers a means for coping with uncertainty and 
subjectivity. Solution quality is determined by 
a user-defined utility function, which encapsu­
lates the preferences of a problem-solver for dif­
ferent possible outcomes. Provided that we can 
determine the probability of each outcome, we 
can make decisions based on expected utility. 
In the next two sections, we discuss how these 
basic techniques can be realized, and applied in 
algorithms. 
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4 Algorithms 
4.1 Off-Line and On-Line Algorithms 
Current search algorithms for single-agent do­
mains are unable to help resource-bounded 
problem-solvers solve real-world problems, be­
cause they fail to control the combinatorial ex­
plosion of state-spaces. 
Because they must guarantee p-optimality, 
current algorithms are prevented from commit­
ting to even a single action before the ultimate 
goal is found. We term this static design pro­
cess, in which computation wholly precedes ex­
ecution, off-line problem-solving. 
The uncertainty inherent in goal-oriented 
problem-solving demands that we develop algo­
rithms which are capable of deciding on an ac­
tion after only limited search. Such algorithms 
exemplify the characteristics of most intelligent 
real-world agents, who interact with their envi­
ronment in the following manner: 
Sense: Collect data about the surround­
ing environment using heuristic evaluation 
functions. 
Interpret: Convert raw heuristic data into 
estimates of the probabilities of outcomes. 
Act: Choose and apply the best operator. 
This simple loop describes the behavior of 
resource-bounded agents who must operate in 
uncertain or complex environments. 
We term this dynamic, interactive approach, 
which interleaves computation and execution, 
on-line problem-solving. An on-line algorithm 
commits to action without the luxury of cer­
tainty, potentially sacrificing optimality. It 
should be apparent that off-line algorithms, 
such as A*, are merely that special case of on­
line algorithms where the loop is executed only 
once. This may be appropriate if the prob­
lem solver has unbounded resources, and the 
length of the solution-path is the only attribute 
he seeks to optimize. 
On-line algorithms are far more flexible than 
the off-line subclass. They can adapt to chang­
ing or hostile environments, incorporate new 
information after each move, make decisions 
under time and resource constraints, and pro­
duce satisficing solutions to problems whose p­
optimal solutions are intractable. 
A simple on-line algorithm is Minimin (4]. 
Minimin performs fixed-depth lookahead in a 
one-player game, and makes one move toward 
that lea£ node with minimum heuristic value. 
Minimin follows the "face-value principle" of 
heuristic interpretation, ignoring the uncer­
tainty of the information it receives from locka­
head, and attempting no probabilistic assess­
ment of solution quality. In decision-making 
under uncertainty, probabilistic assessment of 
outcomes is a prerequisite for the use of utility 
theory. 
Sophisticated techniques for dealing with un­
certainty are required. A system is under devel­
opment which views heuristic evaluation func­
tions as uncertain information regarding the 
outcome associated with each problem state 
(2], and exploits the constraints among these 
outcomes to better estimate the quality of the 
problem-solver's immediately available options 
[3]. 
4.2 One- and Two-Player Games 
Research on single-agent problems and two­
player games has bifurcated precisely on the 
central issues of this paper- computation time 
and optimality. 
This can be understood by examining the 
origins of single-agent problem-solving research 
in the branch-and-bound techniques of combi­
natorial optimization, and the origins of two­
player game research in Shannon's adapta­
tion of game theory to chess [8]. Researchers 
in single-agent problem-solving designed algo­
rithms which guaranteed p-optimal solutions 
because the problems they typically experi­
mented with (such as the Eight·· Puzzle) were 
extremely simple. 
In contrast, the obvious intractability of 
searching the complete chess tree led early re­
searchers of two-player games to relinquish the 
guarantee of optimality afforded by the tech­
niques they borrowed from game theory. Re­
alizing the infeasability of off-line approachs, 
they employed on-line algorithms for two-player 
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games. We suggest that single-agent problems 
require on-line algorithms as well. 
Interestingly, the on-line approach discussed 
in [3] eliminates many of the traditional dis­
tinctions between single-agent and two-player 
domains: the differences are localized to the 
outcome constraints. In addition, the multiat­
tribute utility formalism, and the utility-based 
decision-making mechanisms discussed here in 
the context of single-agent problems, easily ex­
tend to the two-player domain. 
4.3 Utility of Algorithms 
The generalized view of solution quality pre­
sented in Sections 2 and 3 suggests that algo­
rithms should be judged based on the utility 
of the solutions they provide. The examples in 
Section 3 depicted a decision-maker faced with 
a choice of 2 possible outcomes. A problem­
solver would find himself in an identical situ­
ation if he were forced to choose between the 
following two algorithms X and Y. X guar­
antees a solution which requires 35 minutes to 
compute but costs $7500 to execute. Y guaran­
tees a· solution which requires 2 weeks to com­
pute and costs only $1250 to execute. Problem­
solvers should choose the better algorithm in 
precisely the same manner as decision-makers 
would choose the better outcome. 
5 Optimizing Expected 
First Results 
Utility: 
A problem-solver's a priori knowledge of the so­
lutions provided by algorithms will rarely be so 
exact. Furthermore, current algorithms are not 
designed to predict the solutions that they will 
provide. However, a user can attempt to create 
performance models of algorithms. Having es­
timated the solutions that different algorithms 
are likely to provide, the user can determine the 
expected utility of each algorithm, and choose 
the best one for his purposes. 
5.1 Performance Modeling 
A practical technique for modeling the perfor­
mance of on-line search algorithms is detailed 
in [1], which describes a system for automating 
the process. The system, with a problem in­
stance and a user's multiattribute utility func­
tion as input, chooses, from among a given fam­
ily of algorithms, the one which is expected to 
provide the user with the highest quality solu­
tions. To estimate these outcomes, the system 
consults internal performance models which are 
based on a Markov model of the search process. 
This system has been succesfully tested on 
the popular Eight Puzzle, where it optimized 
the performance of the Minimin algorithm for 
a user's utility function (with attributes of so­
lution length, space and time). The level of 
lookahead is the only distinguishing parameter 
within the Minimin family of algorithms. 
The multiplicative utility function used in the 
experiments was based on a hypothetical appli­
cation, where elapsed time is limited to 10 min­
utes, memory to 10 megabytes, and solutions 
to 100 moves. The utility function is best sum­
marized by three solutions that it judged to be 
relatively equivalent (note that while minimiz­
ing time and path-length are desirable, space is 
considered as a free, but bounded resource). 
PATH-LENGTH SPACE TIME 
20 moves :::; 9 megabytes 8 min. 
68 moves :::; 9 megabytes 6 min. 
93 moves :::; 9 megabytes 4 min. 
The system estimated, for a given problem in­
stance, the performance of Minimin for different 
levels of lookahead, and output that lookahead 
level which maximized the user's expected util­
ity. For example, for puzzles of depth d = 19, 
the system chose a lookahead level of 16 based 
on the performance model. Tested on 1000 puz­
zles of depth d = 19, that choice of lookahead 
provided the highest actual utility (compared 
with other lookahead levels). 
Over all puzzle depths (1000 puzzle instances 
for each), the system's choices of lookahead level 
provided the highest actual utility 88.3% of the 
time, were within one level of the optimal 95.4% 
of the time, and never erred by more than three 
levels. Furthermore, in these worst cases, it pro­
vided solutions only slightly inferior to the best 
attainable - differing from the optimal choices 
by less than 0.1% in actual utility. 
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While the performance model and the Min­
imin algorithm are very simple, these successful 
results suggest that realistic performance esti­
mates of search algorithms are attainable and 
powerful. Coupled with utility functions, they 
allow us to choose among algorithms, or choose 
parameters for algorithms, which maximize ex­
pected utility for the user. 
5.2 Utility-Based Algorithms 
Attempting to optimize expected utility by pa­
rameterizing existing algorithms is only an in­
termediate step. Real-world problem-solving 
requires algorithms which can more flexibly 
adapt to particular domains, and to particular 
users' utilities. 
For example, a fixed lookahead level (as in 
Minimin) is a rigid, and unnecessary require­
ment for search algorithms. Determining the 
lookahead level dynamically (before each move) 
would be more flexible. The· effort devoted to 
each decision would then be dependent on its 
estimated difficulty. 
Algorithms could ultimately consider the 
utility of every action they take, including node 
generation, heuristic evaluation, etc., subject to 
the constraint that the time required to con­
sider these factors is also a measure of effi­
ciency. In such a setting, lookahead would 
examine some finite connected component of 
the state-space (rather than a fixed-depth full­
width search tree), until the expected utility of 
searching further became less than the expected 
utility of committing to a move. An algorithm 
employing this approach is under development, 
as an extension of the system described in [3]. 
Conclusion 
T his paper has addressed the guaranteed p­
optimality requirement which pervades the 
study of single-agent problem-solving. \Ve have 
found that p-optimality, given its computa­
tional cost, is usually an undesirable prop­
erty, and that guaranteeing p-optimality is usu­
ally an impossible task, for resource-bounded 
agents. 
Instead, such agents should be able to define 
their own measures of solution quality, and as­
sign their own utilities to these solutions. Such 
subjective assessments of solution quality imply 
a subjective optimality, which can be formalized 
within multiattribute utility theory. 
Toward this end, we have drawn a distic­
tion between off-line and on-line approaches to 
problem-solving. On-line algorithms can op­
erate under uncertainty, and within resource 
bounds, searching for solutions that ma..xi.mize 
a problem-solver's expected utility. 
We have demonstrated that considerable suc­
cess can be achieved by parameterizing a simple 
existing algorithm base.d on the solution quality 
predictions of a performance model. vVe outline 
more sophisticated algorithms, equally applica­
ble to both single-agent and two-player games, 
which are under development. 
In summary, we depart from previous ap­
proaches, and propose that the important ques­
tion for heuristic search theory to address is 
how to design real-world problem-solving sys­
tems which can allocate a user's bounded re­
sources to best achieve his goals. 
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